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RECENT CASES
CIVIL PROCEDURE-DTmIT COURT DENIES INTERLOCUTORY
APPEALS CERTIFICATION oN IssUE SETTLED IN CIRCUIT DESPITE
CONFLIOT A oNG CIRCUITS
Action was brought in the Federal District Court for the Southern
District of New York to contest a ruling by the Board of Veterans
Appeals.' Defendant's motion to dismiss on grounds that the district
court lacked jurisdiction 2 to review decisions of the Board was denied on
authority of a controlling decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit.3 Prior to the court of appeals decision in the case relied on, all
four 4 of the other circuits which had considered the issue had found no
jurisdiction in the courts;5 and in the two years since the Second Circuit
decision, one more circuit had joined the majority camp,6 leaving the
Second Circuit aligned alone against five courts of appeals. The Supreme
Court had denied certiorari on both sides of the conflict.7 On defendant's
request for certification prerequisite to appeal under the Interlocutory
Appeals Act of 1958,8 the district court declined to certify, holding that
defendant had failed to meet the requirement of the act that the question
sought to be appealed be one "as to which there is substantial ground for
difference of opinion." 9 Under this language, the court ruled, the test
"is whether defendant has a good enough chance of success so that its
1The Board had approved a decision of the General Counsel of the Veterans
Administration as to the payment of proceeds of life insurance of a deceased serviceman
under the Servicemen's Indemnity Act, ch. 39, 65 Stat. 33 (1951).
2The motion was pursuant to FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b).
3 Wilkinson v. United States, 242 F.2d 735 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 839
(1957).
4 Without explanation, the instant court treats Turner v. United States, 237 F2d
700 (8th Cir. 1956), actually decided several months prior to Wilkinson, as having
postdated that case. Berger v. United States, 170 F. Supp. 795, 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
Whether or not stemming from chronological mistake, the court's assumption prob-
ably does best reflect the actual state of mind of the Second Circuit bench that decided
Wilkinson. The Wilkinson opinion not only fails to recognize the Turner decision,
but expressly relies upon a district court decision, Miller v. United States, 124 F.
Supp. 203 (W.D. Mo. 1954), which was overruled in the Eighth Circuit by Turner.
The Miller case is the only holding in accord with Wilkinson.
5 Turner v. United States, supra note 4; Acker v. United States, 226 F.2d 575
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1008 (1955); Cyrus v. United States, 226 F.2d
416 (lst Cir. 1955); United States v. Houston, 216 F.2d 440 (6th Cir. 1954).
6 Hall v. United States, 258 F.2d 61 (4th Cir. 1958).
7United States v. Wilkinson, 355 U.S. 839 (1957). Acker v. United States,
350 U.S. 1008 (1955).
828 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1958). For discussion of the act see Wright, Interlocutory
Appeals Act of 1958, 23 F.R.D. 199 (1959); Note, 69 YALE L.J. 333 (1959).
928 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1958).
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appeal ought to be given special treatment." 20 Berger v. United States,
170 F. Supp. 795 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
Proposed by the Judicial Conference of the United States 1 1 to "save
unnecessary expense and delay" 12 in the crowded federal courts where
prior to its passage the final judgment rule had generally prevailed,13 the
Interlocutory Appeals Act introduced into the federal system a device for
reviewing interlocutory orders in limine.14 Prerequisite is a certification
by the district judge whose order is attacked that the order (1) involves
a controlling question of law, (2) as to which there is substantial ground
for difference of opinion, and (3) that an immediate appeal from the order
may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.15 "The
Court of Appeals may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be
taken." 16 But application to the court of appeals must be made within
ten days after entry of the order (a requirement which has been supple-
mented in several courts by local rules intended further to preclude possible
utilization of the procedure as a dilatory tactic) 17 and such application
does not stay the district court proceedings unless affirmatively so ordered
by the district or circuit judges.' 8 These narrow restrictions were in-
tended to preclude "piecemeal appeals" 19 and to limit use of the device
to those "exceptional cases" 20 for which its framers intended it--cases
in which particularly lengthy and expensive trial might be avoided by
definitive early adjudication of a separably dispositive issue.21 The courts
10 Berger v. United States, 170 F. Supp. 795, 796 (1959). The court also found
that the case was not one of those "exceptional" cases in which the act was intended
to be employed, id. at 797, see text accompanying note 20 infra, but expressly rested
its decision "on the fact that there is not enough likelihood of success upon the appeal
to warrant the exercise of my discretion in expediting it." Id. at 797.
11 [1952] U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ANN. REP., SPECIAL SEss., 203.
12 H.R. REP. No. 1667, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
1328 U.S.C. § 1291 (1958), provides: "The court of appeals shall have jurisdic-
tion of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States,
. except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court." See Crick,
The Final Judgment As A Basis For Appeal, 4 YALE: L.J. 539 (1932). For some
exceptions to the rule see Wright, supra note 8.
1428 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1958), affords an interlocutory appeal as of right in
certain special cases involving (1) injunctions, (2) receiverships, (3) admiralty,
(4) patent enfringements, and § 24 of the Bankruptcy Act, 30 Stat. 544, as amended,
11 U.S.C. § 47 (1958), also permits an appeal as of right from certain interlocutory
orders. Section 1292(b) of the Judicial Code applies to all district court orders in
civil actions not otherwise appealable as of right. See Continental Grain Co. v.
Federal Barge Lines, Inc., 268 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1959).
15 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1958).
16 Ibid.
17 See Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 268 F.2d 194, 196 (2d Cir. 1959);
Oskoian v. Canuel, 264 F.2d 591, 594 (1st Cir. 1959).
1828 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1958).
19 Biggers v. Bankers Bond Co., 171 F. Supp. 94, 95 (W.D. Ky. 1959). See
Baltimore Contractors v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176 (1954).
2o Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on the Judiciary,
85th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 11, at 8-11 (1958).
21 H.R. RFP. No. 1667, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1958).
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have been rigorous in limiting allowance of the discretionary interlocutory
appeal to these situations. Numerous applications have been disposed of
on the express grounds that they were not of the "exceptional" nature
envisaged by the enactment.22  Under the requirement that the circum-
stance be one in which immediate appellate determination may materially
advance the termination of the litigation, the courts have recognized that
appeal from denial of a motion attacking pleadings is impermissible since,
in the event of reversal, amendment would ordinarily be allowed and trial
would continue after some delay.23 Motions to dismiss for lack of juris-
diction have been more carefully considered because, if successful, they
are obviously dispositive.2 4 The courts have also distinguished "collateral"
questions of "privilege" 25 and "convenience" 26 from "controlling questions
of law." But the instant case is the first which has attempted to gloss the
difference-of-opinion prerequisite or to apply it as a further instrument of
the severe judicial limitation of interlocutory appeal: the first which has
refused certification on this ground.
2 7
It seems clear, as the court assumes, that the difference of opinion
envisaged by the statute is not any possible disagreement among reason-
able men, but a disagreement of judicial minds within the structure of
existing law; for to permit immediate appellate argument of positions which
are tenable on the merits but clearly foreclosed by authority would fail to
serve the purpose of the act. Room for judicial doubt may well be found
.
22 See, e.g., In re Heddendorf, 263 F.2d 887 (1st Cir. 1959) ; Biggers v. Bankers
Bond Co., 171 F. Supp. 94 (W.D. Ky. 1959); Bobolalds v. Compania Panamena
Maritima San Gerassimo, 168 F. Supp. 236 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
2 3 Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 268 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1959) ; Krock v.
Texas Co., 167 F. Supp. 947 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). Compare Carter v. American Bus
Lines Inc., 22 F.R.D. 323 (D. Neb. 1958) (denial of amendment would entail waiver
of jurisdictional defenses).
24 See, e.g., Oskoian v. Canuel, 264 F.2d 591 (1st Cir. 1959) ; Cordero v. Panama
Canal Co., 170 F. Supp. 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
25 United States v. Woodbury, 263 F.2d 784 (9th Cir. 1959) (government sought
to appeal an order requiring production of documents claimed privileged).
26 Deepwater Exploration Co. v. Andrew Weir Ins. Co., 167 F. Supp. 185 (E.D.
La. 1958) (order granting transfer of case deemed not controlling since jurisdiction
of transferee court was questioned only on basis of inconvenience). Compare Orzulak
v. Federal Commerce & Nay. Co., 168 F. Supp. 15 (E.D. Pa. 1958) (transfer order
certified for interlocutory appeal where objection was to jurisdiction of transferee
court).
2 7 In Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 268 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1959), the court
of appeals denied a petition for interlocutory appeal in a case in which the district
judge had certified an order. Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 171 F. Supp. 661
(S.D.N.Y. 1959). The appellate court found that none of the three statutory pre-
requisites was satisfied, but restricted its consideration of the difference-of-opinion
question to the single word "absurdity," 268 F.2d at 197, and to string citation of
authority. It should be noted, in any event, that a court of appeals holding refusing
to allow an interlocutory appeal-even though its reasoning is articulated in terms of
indisputability of the law-is not a holding as to that quantum of ground for dif-
ference of opinion which must exist to warrant certification by a district judge,
since the discretion to deny appeal is absolute in the court of appeals, see Hearings,
supra note 20, at 21 (statement of Judge Mars for the Judicial Conference), and not
subject to a finding of nonfulfillment of the three prescribed conditions of certification.
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in situations where the district court's ruling is one of first impression 28
or one in which decision is a matter of the exercise of judgment in a cir-
cumstance of fact.2 9 But conflict of judicial authority also represents a
particularly evident instance of "substantial ground for difference of
opinion": district courts have certified in such situations, 0 and one com-
mentator has remarked that in these conflict cases "the statutory criterion
is met by its very terms." 3 1  The problem of the instant case-involving
an issue as to which the law is settled within the circuit but as to which
the circuits are in disaccord-presents a difficult question of perspective.
In one earlier case where the decisions of the court of appeals for its own
circuit were against appellant but were opposed by contrary decisions of
other courts of appeals, the district court certified and the court of appeals
took the case 3 2 without discussing the difference-of-opinion issue. In
contrast, the instant court regarded the scope of its inquiry as restricted to
the law of its circuit: decisions elsewhere were looked to only as data for
assessing the likelihood that its own appellate tribunal would change its
mind or, alternatively, that the Supreme Court would act to overrule it.
Finding neither contingency likely,3 3 it ruled certification inappropriate.
Contention might be raised as to the court's estimate of probabilities.
The personnel of the Second Circuit bench had changed,3 4 a lower court
ruling on which it had relied had been overruled,35 and it had had the
opportunity to witness the unfavorable reaction of at least one coordinate
28 This appeared to be the case in Pennsylvania Turnpike Authority v. McGinnes,
169 F. Supp. 580 (E.D. Pa. 1958), rev'd, 268 F2d 65 (3d Cir. 1959). By "first im-
pression" is intended also the significant extension of existing rules of law.
29 Consider Mas v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 167 F. Supp. 657 (W.D. Pa. 1958)
(laches) ; Carter v. American Bus Lines, Inc., 22 F.R.D. 323 (D. Neb. 1958) (amend-
ment of pleadings within FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a) permissible "when justice so re-
quires"). This class of cases involves an institutional discretion in the courts to
balance equities within individual contexts of fact
30 See Bertha Bldg. Corp. v. National Theatres Corp., 166 F. Supp. 805
(E.D.N.Y. 1958), aff'd, 269 F.2d 785 (2d Cir. 1959) (conflict between two prior
decisions of same district court, not instant district court); cf. Cordero v. Panama
Canal Co., 170 F. Supp. 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (conflict of instant holding with two
other district court decisions). Since in none of the cases cited in this note or in
notes 28, 29 supra and note 32 infra did the certifying district courts illuminate their
grants by opinion on the certification issue (in Bertha Building the certification
order is not reported), it is difficult to determine the operation of the various
considerations possibly taken into account in ordering certification. Compare Orzulak
v. Federal Commerce & Nav. Co., 168 F. Supp. 15, 18 (E.D. Pa. 1958) (citing cases
regarded as potentially inconsistent with its challenged ruling).
31 Note, 69 YALE L.J. 333, 342 (1959).
32 Corabi v. Auto Racing, Inc., 264 F2d 784 (3d Cir. 1959) (district court
order unreported).
3 3 "[I]f our Court of Appeals regarded its reasoning so cogent as to require it to
differ from three circuits it will not hesitate to differ from five." Instant case at 796.
See note 36 infra.
34 Circuit Judge Medina who heard Wilkinson had become a Senior Circuit
Judge and there had been several changes among the district court judges, one of
whom often sits with the court of appeals as was the case in Wilkinson.
35 See note 4 supra.
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tribunal to its earlier decision. Even more debatable is the reliance by the
instant district court upon Supreme Court denials of certiorari as indicative
of the Court's disinclination to intervene.8 6 But, more fundamentally, the
whole approach of estimating probabilities neglects one crucial aspect of
the structure of the interlocutory appeals procedure. By the act, dis-
cretion to deny appeal is vested in the courts of appeals as well as in the
district courts, and, indeed, is vested in wider measure in the former.
8 7
This consideration is significant in two regards. It means that what is at
stake in certification is not forcing an appeal on the court of appeals,3 8
but merely requiring that court to look so far into the case as to decide
whether it should be allowed appeal. In the instant situation, this would
entail, largely, the burden of deciding whether, in the face of considerable
adverse authority, the issue of jurisdiction was still foreclosed in the
Second Circuit. The court of appeals, of course, is better placed to make
that decision than the district court. Second, the act's double-level screen-
ing process envisages the exercise of two different judicial functions at the
different tiers. The district court is to winnow out those cases in which-
whether because appeal would not be dispositive or would not advance
determination of the litigation, or because there is no likelihood of re-
36 The weakness of the court's reasoning in this regard has already been pointed
out, Note, 69 YALE L.J. 333, 342 (1959), and needs little elaboration. The tendency
of lower courts to read more into denial of certiorari than is warranted has elicited
from Justices of the Court admonitions that that denial implies no view on the merits.
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953); Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc.,
338 U.S. 912 (1950). The instant court seeks to draw a more subtle kind of impli-
cation from denial of the writ: not that the Court approves of the case as substantive
law, but that it disapproves of the case-and, by implication, of cases raising the
same issue-as material for review. In light of the great burden of work on the
Court and of the complexity of judgment involved in the certiorari process, see
Address by Chief Justice Vinson to the American Bar Association, Sept. 7, 1949,
35 A.B.A.J. 893 (1949), it is very doubtful that even this much can be made out.
Too much depends upon the circumstances in which an individual case presents itself
to the Court to predict from its fate on certiorari the fate of its followers. See
generally authorities cited in HART & WEcHsLER, THE FEDmAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SysTm 1421-22 (1953).
37 "When a district judge . . . shall be of the opinion . . . that the three
prerequisite conditions are met . . . he shall so state in writing. . . . The Court
of Appeals may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken . .. ."
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1958). (Emphasis added.) The broad scope of the discretion
vested in the court of appeals is described in S. REP. No. 2434, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.
3-4 (1958) : "The granting of the appeal is also discretionary with the court of appeals
which may refuse to entertain such an appeal in much the same manner that the
Supreme Court today refuses to entertain applications for writs of certiorari. It
should be made clear that if application for an appeal from an interlocutory order
is filed with the court of appeals, the court of appeals may deny such an application
without specifying the grounds upon which such a denial is based. It could be based
upon a view that the question involved was not a controlling issue. It could be
denied on the basis that the docket of the circuit court of appeals was such that the
appeal could not be entertained for too long a period of time. But, whatever the
reason, the ultimate determination concerning the right of appeal is within the dis-
cretion of the judges of the appropriate circuit court of appeals." See also Milbert v.
Bison Labs., Inc., 260 F.2d 431, 433 (3d Cir. 1958), emphasizing the "independent
judgment" of the district judge and court of appeals.
38 See Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 268 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1959) (refusing
to entertain an appeal despite certification, 171 F. Supp. 661).
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versal 39-even preliminary scrutiny by the court of appeals is unmerited.
The court of appeals is to decide whether, on the whole situation, appeal
is worth its efforts. Within this setting, a test which leads the certifying
district judge to second-guess the appellate court's reaction to an issue
seems to unsettle the allocation of authority statutorily prescribed.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE-ICC MAY NOT DENY MOTOR
CAIRIER CERTIFICATE MERELY BECAUSE CEMENT SHIPPERS TESTIFY
THEY WnL NOT UTIL E TRucK TRANsPoRT
A common carrier by motor vehicle applied for a certificate of public
convenience and necessity I to haul cement in bulk between Missouri
producers' plants and Illinois highway construction sites, a service then
provided only by rail. The application was opposed by the railroads who
testified that they were prepared to carry all the cement needed, and by three
of the five cement producers supplying the highway program 2 who asserted
that they would not utilize truck service at present because of the expense of
erecting motor carrier loading facilities. 3 Two of these opposing producers
said, however, that they would construct such facilities if forced to do so by
competition. The application was supported by an Illinois association of
general contractors and by a highway construction company, a current
consignee of cement, who testified to the advantages of motor over rail
carriage 4 and stated that they would use truck service if it were available.
39 This phrase is not intended to beg the question but to suggest an interpretation
of the difference-of-opinion requirement alternative to that adopted by the instant case
and believed more consonant both with the plain meaning of the act and with the
institution which it structures, within which the district judge is to provide a screen-
ing function which implements the discretionary exercise of judicial judgment by the
court of appeals. It is suggested that the requirement is aimed at the elimination at
the district level of interlocutory appeal applications "based upon spurious grounds,"
S. IREP. No. 2434, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1958), rather than at district court predic-
tion of court of appeals decision.
lInterstate Commerce Act §207(a), 49 Stat. 551 (1935), 49 U.S.C. §307(a)
(1958).
2 One cement producer formally appeared in the proceedings before the Commis-
sion, while two testified for the railroads. Two other known producers supplying
cement for the highway construction did not appear. The answer of the United
States, as a party defendant, admitted that the Commission had failed to make proper
findings as to the "inherent advantages" of the truck service, and prayed that the
orders be set aside and the case remanded. Commercial Transp., Inc. v. United
States, 173 F. Supp. 524, 526 (E.D. Ill. 1959).
3 "No investigation was made as to whether [two supplying cement producers
not appearing at all] . . .have present facilities for loading trucks, or if not,
whether they intend to provide such equipment . . . . " Id. at 527.
4 Door-to-door truck service reduces the need for rail spurs (switches) constructed
at each job site at the cost of the consignee, as well as eliminating the need for local
trucking from railhead to job site. Flexible transportation by truck eliminates large
accumulation of cement and consequent consignee-paid demurrage costs when con-
struction is delayed, and local loss-disposal of excess cement when the project moves
to a new site. Id. at 526-27.
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On this record, the ICC concluded that the trucker had failed to establish
that present or future public convenience and necessity required the pro-
posed service. The reviewing three-judge district court 5 set aside and
remanded to the Commission its order denying the application. It held that
despite shipper opposition the National Transportation Policy 6 required
the agency to assess the "inherent advantages" of motor carriage. Com-
inercial Transp., Inc. v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. Ill. 1959).
Under section 207(a) of the Interstate Commerce Act 7 providing
that "a certificate shall be issued . . . if it is found that . . . the pro-
posed service . . . is or will be required by the present or future public
convenience and necessity," the courts have sustained the Commission's
consideration of future as distinct from present need,8 although no decision
prior to the instant case has held such consideration mandatory.9 Appraisal
of "inherent advantages" 'L under the National Transportation Policy, after
a similar period of permissive judicial approval,"1 had already been declared
5 The complaint was presented under the Interstate Commerce Act § 205(g),
49 Stat. 548 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 30 5(g) (1958), and the Administrative
Procedure Act § 10, 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1958). The jurisdiction
of the court was under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1336, 1398, 2284, 2321-25 (1958). The con-
stitution of the three-judge court is contained in 28 U.S.C. §2284 (1958).
6 "National Transportation Policy: It is hereby declared to be the national trans-
portation policy of the Congress to provide for fair and impartial regulation of all
modes of transportation . . . so administered as to recognize and preserve the in-
hterent advantages of each; to promote safe, adequate, economical, and efficient service
and foster sound economic conditions in transportation and among the several car-
riers; to encourage the establishment and maintenance of reasonable charges for
transportation services, without unjust discriminations, undue preferences or advan-
tages, or unfair or destructive competitive practices; . . . all to the end of develop-
ing, coordinating, and preserving a national transportation system by water, highway,
and rail, as well as other means, adequate to meet the needs of the commerce of the
United States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense." 54 Stat. 899 (1940),
49 U.S.C. preceding § 1 (1958). (Emphasis added.)
749 Stat 551 (1935), 49 U.S.C. §207(a) (1958).
8Where the Commission has looked to future need, the courts have found such
consideration not inappropriate. United States v. Detroit & Cleveland Nay. Co., 326
U.S. 236 (1945) (Commission might consider postwar production of automobiles not
yet begun but which would require transportation); Lang Transp. Corp. v. United
States, 75 F. Supp. 915 (S.D. Cal. 1948) (Commission justified in considering potential
postwar growth of region and traffic therein, as well as present need for competing
motor carrier operations) ; Kansas City & Leavenworth Transp. Co. v. United States,
51 F. Supp. 916 (D. Del. 1943) (postwar need by military personnel for transporta-
tion to army camp may be assessed along with present need).
9 The Detroit & Cleveland Nay. Co. case, supra note 8, did not hold, as the court
in the instant case at 528 seemed to think, that Commission failure to consider future
need is error.
10 See note 6 supra. Before the National Transportation Policy was added to
the act, § 207(a) had been subject to a declaration that it was the policy of Congress
to regulate motor carrier transportation in such a manner as to recognize and preserve
its inherent advantages. Motor Carrier Act of 1935, ch. 498, § 2 02(a), 49 Stat. 543.
This was repealed when the Policy was passed. Transportation Act of 1940, ch. 722,
tit. I, § 1, 54 Stat. 899.
31ICC v. Parker, 326 U.S. 60, 73 (1945) (dictum); (Commission grant of
certificate to motor carrier subsidiary of railroad to conduct less-than-carload carriage
along rail lines in conjunction with rail service); cf. United States v. Rock Island
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a prerequisite to issuance of a valid Commission order denying motor car-
rier certification.12  In Schaffer Transp. Co. v. United States,'5 a trucker,
with the support of shippers and consignees, sought a certificate to haul
granite from the shippers' plants to areas where there was rail, but no
motor carrier, service. Finding that the shippers were interested only
in cheaper rates, the Commission had denied the application on the grounds
that existing rail service was "reasonably adequate." 14 The Supreme
Court rejected the contention that cheaper rates were not relevant to
applications for certificates 15 and held that the Commission must assess
the need for a service that supplies the particular advantages possessed by
motor carriers where currently only rails are serving the shippers.18
Although couched by the court in terms of Schaffer and the National
Transportation Policy,17 the significant holding of the instant case is that
Motor Transit Co., 340 U.S. 419 (1951) (in approving subsequent Commission modi-
fications of prior certificates granted to rail-owned motor carriers, holding based on
former § 202(a) and the National Transportation Policy) ; see also United States v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 323 U.S. 612 (1945) (affirming Commission's ordering railroads
to abstain from observing and enforcing rules and practices which prohibited the
interchange of their freight cars for transportation by Seatrain). But see Ayer v.
United States, 139 F. Supp. 440, 443-44 (N.D. Ga. 1956) (dictum) (in approving
Commission denial of certificate to motor carrier, court did not reach situation in
which only existing service was a different mode of transportation).
12 Such consideration had even earlier been held mandatory in rate cases. Dixie
Carriers, Inc. v. United States, 351 U.S. 56 (1956) (railroads, having established a
joint rail rate for sulphur shipments lower than the combination rail-barge rate,
refused to establish a joint rail-barge rate between the same points) ; ICC v. Mechling,
330 U.S. 567 (1947) (Commission had approved rates for ex-rail grain shipment from
Chicago to the East that were lower than the ex-barge rates); ICC v. Inland Water-
ways Corp., 319 U.S. 671, 693 (1943) (Mr. Justice Black, dissenting); see Pacific
Inland Tariff Bureau, 129 F. Supp. 472, 476-77, opinion supplemented, 134 F. Supp.
210, 212 (D. Ore. 1955) (dictum) (although correct to consider other parts of National
Transportation Policy, Commission must also assess impact of competition on existing
carriers in approving lower railroad rates). But see National Water Carriers Ass'n
v. United States, 120 F. Supp. 719, 724-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (L. Hand, J.) (water
carriers cannot complain that they cannot survive at the rail rates established by
Commission when those rates are compensatory to railroads, as the railroads have the
"inherent advantage").
13 355 U.S. 83 (1957).
14 A. W. Schaffer, 63 M.C.C. 247, 257 (1955).
15 "The ability of one mode of transportation to operate with a rate lower than
competing types of transportation is precisely the sort of 'inherent advantage' that
the congressional policy requires the Commission to recognize." 355 U.S. at 91.
16After Schaffer the courts have twice affirmed Commission denials of motor
carrier certificates. Associated Transp., Inc. v. United States, 169 F. Supp. 769 (E.D.
Mo. 1958) (serving contract carrier was almost totally dependent on supporting
shipper; balancing impairment of existing carrier service against advantages of pro-
posed service is within Commission discretion) ; Bass v. United States, 163 F. Supp.
1, 3 (W.D. Va. 1958) (common carriers were performing contract function proposed
by applicant contract carrier; difference between contract carrier and common carrier
performing contract functions is not the type of "inherent advantages" Congress
meant in Policy).
17 "The fact that the shippers opposed the application and would not use the
service, in itself, does not nullify or detract from the effect of the directive in the
Schaffer case that the Commission must assess the advantages of the proposed service
in relation to public need." Instant case at 529.
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the Commission cannot deny a certificate for motor carriage of cement
merely because opposing current shippers 18 assert that they will not utilize
truck transport.19 The crucial impact of that decision is not so much on the
rail-motor conflict itself, but on the vested interests of the producers of
cement. For while the testifying shippers claimed that they did not have
facilities for loading trucks, their motivation for opposing the certification
of a motor carrier was obviously something other than a mere lack of
intent to use its service. Evidence that the producers would construct
loading facilities and use trucks if forced to by competition indicates that
motor carrier service has some advantages which would tend to put its
employer in an advantageous competitive position. If none of the supply-
ing producers had these facilities and none would construct them because
of the allegedly great expense,20 there would be little reason for these
shippers to oppose carrier certification. What was at stake, and what was
feared was the thing that would create a use of the proposed service-
the excitation of unwanted competition in the sale of cement. 21 Truck
carriage, because it would lessen the ability of the industry to rely on known
rail transportation charges, 22 would result in the weakening of control by
producers over delivered prices of cement.23  The normal competitive
desire of a seller to render more economical service to the purchaser is
18 Instant case at 528. The court pointed out that the Commission had not found
that truck service would "never be used but merely that the cement producers would
not presently utilize its service," and, citing United States v. Detroit & Cleveland
Nay. Co., 326 U.S. 236 (1945), added that "future as well as immediate need of service
is an essential element to be considered by the Commission . . . ." This reference
to future need would not appear necessary in view of the fact that the court's holding is
supported by a demonstrated present need in the consignee. In fact, the court has
really treated the producer testimony as insufficient to establish that there will be no
immediate use of the service.
19 For a discussion of the importance to the cement industry of suppressing the
utilization of motor carriage in cement hauling see Loescher, Inert Antitrust Admnis-
tration: Formula Pricing and the Cement Industry, 65 YALE L.J. 1 (1955).
20 Loescher anticipates this producer complaint and that "the fact that loading
equipment was allowed to be scrapped because it was no longer needed after the initial
[cement industry] agreement to eliminate trucking was made presumably would go
unmentioned . . . ." Id. at 12.
21 "The belief is prevalent in the industry that because of the standardized nature
of cement, among other reasons, price competition is wholly unsuited to it. That
belief is historic. It has resulted in concerted activities to devise means and measures
to do away with competition in the industry." FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S.
683, 713 (1948) (sustaining the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant the Conmis-
sion's finding of concerted action). Loescher maintains that the effects of the industry
restraint of trade have not been removed by the victory of the FTC in that case.
Loescher, supra note 19, at 13-15.
22 The Commission found that the three appearing cement producers now control
the mode of transportation by which cement is hauled. Instant case at 527.
23 "[T]he basic collective interest of cement manufacturers in refusing sales to
trucks of local buyers lay in the preservation of a system of known transportation
charges for use in pricing formulas." Loescher, stpra note 19, at 4.
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absent here, under the suppression of cohesive forces within the cement
oligopoly.
24
Thus the instant case seems eminently sound. When the competitive
factors in commerce are functioning normally there is little cause for the
transportation regulating agency to be directly concerned with the needs
of the consignee, whose interests will ordinarily coincide with those of the
shipper. Shipper interests in proposed services have usually supported
the petition of the carrier applicant in certification proceedings,25 and de-
mands of the receivers have ordinarily been regarded as significant only
as they have gone to prove the needs of the shippers.26 But to apply that
principle here would have been to make shipper interest which lay more
in suppressing competition than in acquiring an improved means by which
to serve the customer the sole arbiter of the requirements of public con-
venience and necessity.27 The court's holding, of course, does not make
certification mandatory when receivers want motor carrier service.
28 It
does assure that the Commission will not make the certificate of public
convenience and necessity an instrument by which competition in areas
other than transportation can be restrained.29
24 Also, evidence as to forced local disposal by the consignee of large surplus
quantities of rail-hauled cement indicates that some lesser amount of cement might
be purchased if motor carriage eliminated the consignee's accumulation of large
quantities. Instant case at 527.
25 See Schaffer Transp. Co. v. United States, 355 U.S. 83, 85 (1957) ; Carl Subler
Trucking, Inc., 77 M.C.C. 707 (1958); A. W. Schaffer, 77 M.C.C. 5 (1958); P. B.
Mutrie Motor Transp., Inc., 76 M.C.C. 171 (1958).
26 In both rate and certification cases the courts and the Commission have con-
sidered the needs of receivers as they affect the competitive requirements of shippers
or producers. Schaffer Transp. Co. v. United States, 355 U.S. 83 (1957) ; Pennsyl-
vania R.R. v. United States, 323 U.S. 588 (1945); Acme Fast Freight, Inc. v. United
States, 146 F. Supp. 369 (D. Del. 1956) ; Wilson v. United States, 114 F. Supp. 814
(W.D. Mo. 1953); A. W. Schaffer, supra note 25; Williams Motor Transfer, Inc.,
67 M.C.C. 735 (1956).
27Although the Interstate Commerce Commission may not be free to regulate
transportation to promote competition in fields where that competition-or lack thereof
-does not affect transportation (see McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321
U.S. 67, 85-86 (1943) (dictum to the effect that the antitrust laws are significant in
Commission determinations chiefly when they affect the objective of the National
Transportation Policy)), the motivations of parties and witnesses are appropriate
matters for the Commission in weighing evidence and arriving at conclusions. (The
Schaffer case did not hold that the Commission could not evaluate the motives of the
shippers, but merely that the fact that they wanted cheaper rates could not negative the
value of their evidence. The Court pointed out that the factors motivating the shippers
in Schaffer were ones of which Congress approved in its regulation policy. See note
15 supra and accompanying text.)
2 8 "[I]t is for the Commission and not this court to determine the weight of the
'inherent advantages of the proposed service.'" Instant case at 528.
29 Note, however, that the delay in final resolution due to the Commission's order
and its subsequent review is not inconsiderable. The elapsed time from the moment
Commercial filed its application on October 26, 1956, to the court's remand on January
23, 1959, with the issue still to be resolved, necessarily works to protect the status quo
of both the railroads and the cement producers. The significance of this protection
mounts in relation to the expected, or actual, duration of the highway project. See
also ICC v. Inland Waterways Corp., 319 U.S. 671, 703 (1943) (Mr. Justice Black,
dissenting).
RECENT CASES
JURISDICTION-DISTRInqT SALE OF TAXPAYER'S MORTGAGED
CHaATTELS HELD NOT To CONSTITUTE WAIVER OF SOVEEIGN
IMMUNITY AS TO MORTGAGEE
The United States held several tax liens against the property of a
delinquent taxpayer, some senior and others junior to a valid chattel mort-
gage held by plaintiff bank. The District Director of Internal Revenue
issued a warrant of distraint 1 against the mortgaged property and, apply-
ing the total proceeds of the subsequent sale 2 to the tax debt, deposited
those proceeds in the Treasury.3 The bank brought action against the
United States asserting a right to the amount of the proceeds in excess of
the senior liens. The court of appeals affirmed a district court dismissal
for lack of jurisdiction,4 holding that the facts alleged were without the
scope of statutory consent by the sovereign to be sued on express or implied
contracts. 5 First Natl Bank v. United States, 265 F.2d 297 (3d Cir.
1959).
The doctrine of sovereign immunity requires that any assertion of a
claim against the United States be brought within the ambit of congressional
1 Authority for the distraint is found in the INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6331.
2 Proceeds of the sale are applied according to INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6342.
3 Pursuant to INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7809.
4 First Nat!1 Bank v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 844 (W.D. Pa. 1958).
528 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2) (1958). The plaintiff submitted three other statutes
two of which appear without relevance to waiver of sovereign immunity. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1340 (1958), providing for jurisdiction in the district courts "of any civil action
arising under any Act of Congress providing for internal revenue . . . ," seems to
have been designed to permit district court suits against collectors of internal revenue
regardless of diversity. See Flora v. United States, 357 U.S. 63, 67 & n.8 (1958)
(dictum), petition for rehearing granted, 360 U.S. 922 (1959); cf. Philadelphia v.
The Collector, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 720, 721 (1866) (dictum). But cf. Johnston v.
Earle, 245 F.2d 793, 795 (9th Cir. 1957) (dictum). It is relied upon to show subject-
matter jurisdiction of the court, see, e.g., Powell v. Granquist, 252 F.2d 56 (9th Cir.
1958), whereas to show jurisdiction over the United States as a party another statute
must be cited. See, e.g., Seattle Ass'n of Credit Men v. United States, 240 F.2d 906
(9th Cir. 1957). 28 U.S.C. § 2463 (1958), is of a similar effect. See, e.g., Seattle
Ass'n of Credit Men v. United States, supra; Lavino v. Jamison, 230 F2d 909 (9th
Cir. 1956) ; Gerth v. United States, 132 F. Supp. 894 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
The third statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (1) (1958), presents more substance for
argument as a waiver of sovereign immunity in the instant case. It grants jurisdic-
tion to the district courts of "any civil action against the United States for the recovery
of any internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or
collected . . . or any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrong-
fully collected under the internal revenue laws . . . ." Disposing of this section as
a possible basis for jurisdiction, the instant court briefly stated that it does not apply
to claims by others than taxpayers, holding that the language "is reasonably to be
[so] read." Instant case at 299-300. DeVan v. United States, 50 F. Supp. 992 (D.
N.J. 1943), is in accord. However, no appellate court has yet ruled on the issue, and
the legislative history of the section, while inconclusive, at least gives no affirmative
indication that nontaxpayers are without its scope. See 61 CONG. REc. 7506 (1921)
(remarks of Senator Jones) ; H.R. REP. No. 659, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954). See
also H.R. REP. No. 662, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954). It should be noted that both
DeVan and the instant case appear to consider only the first clause of the section,
authorizing suit "for recovery of any internal revenue tax."
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grants of jurisdiction over suits against the sovereign. 6 Section 1346
(a) (2) of the Judicial Code provides a waiver of sovereign immunity as
to claims ". . . founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of
Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any
express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or
unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort." Interpreting the
"implied contract" phrase, the courts have found a promise by the govern-
ment to pay the value of property appropriated where the official had been
acting within the scope of his authority and the United States, in exercising
some governmental right, had admitted,7 or at least had not denied,8 that
it was taking from the claimant some right incident to ownership. The
stated rule of the many authoritative cases which, on the other hand, have
held no waiver is that contracts implied "in law" (as opposed to those
implied "in fact") are without the scope of the statute.9 This is the rule
of United States v. Minnesota Mut. Inv. Co. 10 -that equitable considera-
tions are improper as a basis for such an "implied" contract as will subject
the United States to civil jurisdiction. On their facts these cases show,
more precisely, that in each the government had at the time of taking
denied any right to the property in the claimant 11 or had subsequently
asserted that the actions of the official which resulted in the taking were
unauthorized.'
2
Somewhat in contrast to the no-equitable-considerations language, a
few lower court decisions appear which, ostensibly relying on the phrase
"natural justice and equity" found in United States v. State Bank,'3 sustain
jurisdiction on the basis of implied contract despite failure of the allegations
to show any recognition by the government of plaintiff's particular claim
6 See generally Block, Suits Against Government Oflcers and the Sovereign
Immunity Doctrine, 59 HARV. L. REV. 1060 (1946) ; Note, 33 N.C.L. REv. 276 (1955) ;
Note, 40 Gzo. L.J. 289 (1952). The doctrine has been justified on the basis of royal
supremacy, indignity of subjecting the government to judicial process at the insistence
of private parties, the theory that there can be no legal right against the authority
upon which legal rights depend, protection of the state against compulsory payment
of debts, the danger of serious interference with governmental activities. Block,
supra at 1060-61, regards only the last of these as of any modem significance.
See Alliance Assur. Co. v. United States, 252 F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1958).
8 See United States v. Buffalo Pitts Co., 234 U.S. 228, 234 (1914) ; United States
v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903).
9 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 287 (1928); United
States v. Minnesota Mut. Inv. Co., 271 U.S. 212 (1926) ; Merritt v. United States, 267
U.S. 338 (1925); Cobb v. Shore, 183 F.2d 980 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Baltimore Mail
S.S. Co. v. United States, 76 F.2d 582 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 595 (1935).
10 271 U.S. 212 (1926).
11 See Alabama v. United States, 282 U.S. 502 (1931) ; United States v. Minne-
sota Mut. Inv. Co., 271 U.S. 212 (1926); Merritt v. United States, 267 U.S. 338
(1925).
12 See, e.g., Sutton v. United States, 256 U.S. 575 (1921).
13 96 U.S. 30, 35 (1877).
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at the time of the taking. In Kirkendall v. United States,1 4 the federal
revenue authorities, levying against a delinquent taxpayer, took by distraint
from the United States postal inspector moneys that had been used by him
as evidence in the conviction of the taxpayer for fraudulent use of the mails.
An action against the United States by the wife of an unwitting employee
of the taxpayer, claiming that the money taken had in fact been the personal
funds of the employee, was sustained on the ground that the government
could not have but known, at the time the fund was taken, that the money
was not the taxpayer's. Upon this knowledge, without further allegation
of awareness by the tax officials of the employee's interest, a "contract," for
purposes of Section 1346(a) (2), was implied. In Royal Indem. Co. v.
Board of Education,15 the United States, by threatening to levy on the
property of the board for satisfaction of the tax debts of a contractor, forced
the board to pay over to it funds held owing to the contractor under a
construction contract. That contract required provision of a surety for
performance by the contractor, and in its agreement with the surety the
contractor had made assignment of all retained percentage on the contract
price. Contractor defaulted and surety completed construction. In surety's
action against board for the remainder of the price, board was permitted to
bring in the United States as a third-party defendant although, here again,
no affirmative knowledge by the government of the claimant's alleged rights
was shown. In this group of cases, then, the "natural justice and equity"
tag seems in fact to cover a more consensual rationale: that the government
would not deliberately so act in appropriating funds as potentially to cut
off interests probably involved, unless with the tacit understanding that it
would make just compensation. So understood, the cases are a refinement,
not a repudiation, of the Minnesota Mutual line.
The essence of the complaint in the instant case was that by selling the
distrained chattel and refusing to turn over the proceeds in excess of the
senior liens the government had deprived plaintiff of its interests under the
chattel mortgage.' 6 The United States in answer admitted the existence
of the plaintiff's chattel mortgage and the priority of the liens,1 7 and did
not deny knowledge of the mortgage at the time of taking.' 8 It contended
that it had sold only the interest of the taxpayer, pursuant to specific provi-
sion of the Internal Revenue Code.' 9 If so, admittedly, implied-contract
1490 Ct. Cl. 606, 31 F. Supp. 766 (1940). Accord, Tucker v. United States, 95
Ct. Cf. 415, 42 F. Supp. 292 (1942).
15 137 F. Supp. 890 (M.D.N.C. 1956).
16 The complaint may be found in Brief for Appellant, pp. 3a-7a, instant case.
17 The answer may be found in Brief for Appellant, pp. 8a-l1a, instant case. For
further clarification of the parties' contentions the Transcript of Proceedings on Pre-
trial, Brief for Appellant, pp. 12a-37a, instant case, is helpful.
18 The United States admitted in its answer that the mortgage had been recorded,
Brief for Appellant, p. 8a (para. V), and pleaded lack of sufficient knowledge to answer
plaintiff's allegation that the mortgaged property had been tagged prior to the taking.
Id. at 9a (para. VIII).
19 See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6339 (a) (2) : "(a) . . . . In all cases of sale
• . . of property (other than real property), the certificate of such sale ....
(2) . . . Shall transfer to the purchaser all right, title, and interest of the party
delinquent in and to the property sold . ... "
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jurisdiction would be difficult to find, inasmuch as the government would
not be supposed to have intended to make payment for interests it was not
purporting to take. But it appears that, under the Code provision invoked,
what is conveyed is the taxpayer's interest at the time the government's first
lien attached,20 and since in this case the property was unencumbered at
that time, it is highly likely that a court would hold the sale to have been
free of the plaintiff's mortgage. The pleadings therefore bring the case
within the Kirkendall principle. The court recognized this, but nevertheless
mechanically employed the "implied in law"-"implied in fact" distinction,
finding the prescriptions of Kirkendall for the instant case irreconcilable
with Minnesota Mutual.21 While arguments on the merits pro and contra
Kirkendall itself might be made, such a categorical approach as the court's,
foreclosing the question by application of broad black-letter dogma, com-
pletely fails to recognize the very real flexibility available within the
implied-contract precedents.
LABOR LAW-REMEDY FOR MISASSIGsTMENT OF OVERTIME HEI
NOT ARBITa2BI.E
Union brought suit in a federal district court to compel employer to
arbitrate its claim of misassignment of overtime, including union's remedial
claim for wage payment to the aggrieved employee at the overtime rate.
Union alleged the misassignment to be the latest in a series of similar
breaches of the collective bargaining contract by employer. Employer, who
had at first admitted breach but had throughout a long course of grievance
negotiation refused to recognize compensatory wage payment as the ap-
propriate redress, consented to submit only the issue of breach to arbitration,
maintaining that under the contract's arbitration clause questions of remedy
were not "differences relating to the interpretation or performance" 1 of
the agreement. The district court and the court of appeals agreed, holding,
first, that the determination of whether a disputed issue is arbitrable is for
the court; second, that under the contract only the issue of breach was
within the arbitrator's competence. Refinery Employees Union v. Con-
tinental Oil Co., 268 F. 2d 447 (5th Cir. 1959).
20 Blacklock v. United States, 208 U.S. 75 (1908) ; Commercial Credit Corp. v.
Schwartz, 130 F. Supp. 524, 531 (E. D. Ark. 1955).
21 Instant case at 300.
1 The arbitration clause of the collective-bargaining agreement was in the form
common to many such agreements: "Only differences relating to the interpretation or
performance of this agreement which cannot be adjusted by mutual agreement, after
processing through the grievance procedure may . . . be submitted to arbitration."
Refinery Employees Union v. Continental Oil Co., 268 F.2d 447, 453 n.6 (5th Cir.
1959).
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The position of the federal courts regarding specific enforcement of
collective bargaining agreements to arbitrate has developed from early ad-
herence to the common-law doctrine of nonenforceability,2 through the rule
of the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 3 (which, allowing such a remedy in
many other arbitration cases, specifically denied it to labor-management con-
tracts), to Taft-Hartley's section 301(a), 4 which provides: "Suits for
violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization .
may be brought in any district court . . . ." The Supreme Court has
interpreted 301 (a) as extending federal jurisdiction over actions for
specific performance of agreements to arbitrate and as a mandate "that the
substantive law to apply in suits under § 301 (a) is federal law, which the
courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws." 5 Under
that law there is ample authority holding that the arbitrability of a given
grievance contention is a question for the court.6 But the instant case is
the first to split off breach from remedy and to deny the arbitrator power
to decide the latter where the former is held within his jurisdiction.
Parenthetically the court reserved judgment as to "any remedy the
aggrieved employee or the Union may have for misassigned overtime
work." 7 Alternative possible readings of that reservation illuminate the
implications of the decision. The court may be leaving open the possibility
of a judicial remedy in the event that the arbitrator finds a misassignment.
The opinion elsewhere insists that inasmuch as the dispute concerning
appropriate remedy is a basic one, the proper persons to decide it are "the
representatives of the Union and the Company, not some third arbitrator." &
But by definition in this context the collective bargainers have -not decided
that issue prior to breach, breach has occurred, and if there is to be a remedy
at all, some third party must determine it. To say that court decision,
rather than decision by the arbitrator to whom the contracting parties did
agree to submit the issue of breach, most closely approximates the probable
2Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 120-21 (1924) (dictum).
39 U.S.C. § 1 (1958): "[B]ut nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts
of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged
in foreign or interstate commerce."
461 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958): "Suits for violation of con-
tracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an
industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor
organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having
jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without
regard to the citizenship of the parties."
5 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957).
6 E.g., Boston Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 258 F.2d 516.
(1st Cir. 1958); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Cameron Iron Works, Inc.,
257 F.2d 467 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 880 (1958) ; International Union of
Operating Engineers v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 164 F. Supp. 406 (W.D. Ark. 1958).
7 Instant case at 458.
8 Id. at 459.
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intent of those parties seems unjustified. Equally unjustified would be a
court-over-arbitrator choice grounded on considerations of which forum is
more expert and more capable in the matter of grievance remedies.9
But, alternatively, the court by its parenthetical may be merely with-
holding comment as to the appropriate remedy, but suggesting that if the
arbitrator found a misassignment the parties would be left to negotiate a
remedy, with no further recourse to any authoritative tribunal.10 This
would relegate the parties to substantially the same position they had
occupied prior to suit, with the bargaining table called upon to supply an
agreement which the long-drawn grievance negotiation proceedings have
already demonstrated is unlikely to be achieved."1 Such an outcome calls
in doubt the basic approach of segregating breach and remedy components
within the labor dispute. Consent has always been prerequisite to arbitra-
tion. 12  The parties' consent to permit an arbitrator to determine the
existence of a breach consummates a bargaining of important rights and
duties. It is likely that those parties contemplated something more than a
bare determination of the fact of violation-rather that they contemplated
that the party injured be made whole and that the possibility of recurrence
be restricted by the coercion implicit in the award. Having consented the
authority to arbitrate should they not be supposed to have consented
powers of effective arbitration, including the award of any remedy which
experience would reveal as necessary and reasonable to prevent further
invasion of the violated right? The conclusion is reinforced by considera-
tion of the measures to which bargainers would perforce have to resort in
their agreements in order to avoid the frustrating effect of the instant deci-
sion. They might include a general arbitrability clause,' 3 but this has
heretofore been found unacceptable in the majority of collective bargaining
9 See Mayer, Judicial "Bulls" in the Delicate China Shop of Labor Arbitration,
2 LAB. L.J. 502 (1951).
10 The majority opinion refers to the company's no-work-no-pay policy, which
underlies the dispute over remedy, as a subject for the bargaining table, instant
case at 459, and elsewhere argues: "[T]here is no basis for asserting that without
damages the union has a right but not a remedy: the remedy is settlement of the
classification or proper assignment. The union is not in the position of an ordinary
private litigant asserting a claim for breach of contract." Id. at 458.
"1 This will ordinarily be the case, since resort to the courts for the enforcement of
agreements to arbitrate, under clauses such as that set forth in note 1 supra, will follow
failure of grievance processing procedures.
12 See Food Handlers Local 425 v. Pluss Poultry, Inc., 158 F. Supp. 650 (W.D.
Ark.), aff'd, 260 F.2d 835 (8th Cir. 1958).
13 Such a clause would provide that the arbitrator shall have the power to deter-
mine the arbitrability of all disputes raised under the agreement. In this regard note
the position taken by the National Academy of Arbitrators in their draft No. 3 of a
proposed United States Arbitration Act (1959). Section 4 of that draft provides
that the arbitrator's authority shall, "unless the parties by their agreement have ex-
pressly provided for prior judicial determination, include the authority initially to
determine any issue raised regarding his jurisdiction . . . . " reserving to the parties
the right to make a subsequent claim of lack of jurisdiction.
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contracts. 4 They might include a damages section appropriate to each
provision of the agreement-a cumbersome procedure which would demand
more of a difficult collective bargaining agreement than is demanded of a
commercial contract.'6  Finally, they might have recourse to a general
damages provision similar to the general concession of arbitrability agreed
upon in the first instance-an alternative probably also unacceptable in
view of certain provisions characteristically present in a bargaining agree-
ment, such as that proscribing the subversion of a shop steward in his
union activities, breach of which presents an injury not readily susceptible
of monetary valuation. The unfeasibility of each of these alternatives lends
strength to the reasonableness of inferring that, absent a specific remedial
provision, the parties consented to an arbitrator's award of those remedies
necessary to make the agreement viable.' 6 This inferred consent is quite
different from supplying a fatal lack of consent to arbitrate indefinite or
unspecified issues, or resolving consensual problems regarding the compo-
sition of the board of arbitrators.' 7 And, in any event, the avenue of appeal
of an award on the grounds of unreasonableness will presumably still be
open, on the theory that no consent to such an award could be inferred.' 8
This result would harmonize, moreover, with the usual experience of
arbitrators that the parties, while frequently raising the issue of arbitrability,
nevertheless actually permit the arbitrator to decide the issue and award a
'4 Frey, The Proposed Uniform Arbitration Act Should Not Be Adopted, 10
VAND. L. Rnv. 709, 710 (1957).
15 "It will be unfortunate if collective bargaining agreements develop along the
lines of the revenue laws, with provision necessarily being made for every little hair-
line question which may arise . . . . They will lose their effectiveness when they
become so involved that laymen cannot follow or understand them. It would contribute
dangerously to that tendency if it were required that every contract clause had to
include a damages provision." International Harvester Co., 9 Lab. Arb. 894, 896
(1947). This language of arbitrator Wirtz was noted in Mississippi Aluminum
Corp., 27 Lab. Arb. 625, 628 (1956), where in an overtime dispute arbitrator Reynard
answered the employer's contention based on the absence of a penalty clause by saying,
"Similar objections can, and sometimes are, raised [sic] with respect to numerous
types of violations, but arbitrators have uniformly declared that the absence of con-
tractual language imposing sanctions in such cases is no bar to the awarding of
compensation."
36 Union's allegation that the misassignment was the most recent of a series of
admitted but uncurbed violations would indicate if substantiated, that the agreement
could not compel observance of its provisions unless sanctions were imposed.
17 See Food Handlers Local 425 v. Pluss Poultry, Inc., 158 F. Supp. 650 (W.D.
Ark.), aff'd, 260 F.2d 835 (8th Cir. 1958), where the union initiated and prosecuted
to a conclusion the arbitration proceedings without the employer's participation.
18 Authority in the labor field is lacking, but commercial authority supports the
proposition that an award may be so grossly inadequate or excessive that it will be
vacated, Harrington v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 179 Minn. 510, 511-12, 229 N.W. 792,
793 (1930), subsequenat award on remand rev'd, 183 Minn. 74, 235 N.W. 535 (1931),
although, unless restricted by the agreement of submission, arbitrators are final judges
of both law and fact, Pierce Steel Corp. v. Flannery, 319 Pa. 332, 339, 179 At. 558,
561 (1935). The award must be coextensive with the issues submitted. See, e.g.,
DeGroot v. United States, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 419 (1866) ; New York & Cumberland
R.R. v. Myers, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 246 (1855). Thus for example, a $1,000 award
to be paid the Red Cross as a penalty for wrongfully discharging an employee would
be assailable.
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remedy if one is necessary. 19 It is submitted that the withholding of this
seemingly natural power from the arbitrator deviates from the court's
avowed policy "that private arbitration in the labor-management field is
to be afforded broad liberalities." 
20
19 Frey, supra note 14, at 721-22: "When a union sincerely believes that it is
contractually entitled to have a given dispute arbitrated, and when the employer with
equal sincerity believes the union's demand for arbitration oversteps the agreed
boundary, this is no occasion for a strike or a lockout or for injecting a court or an
administrative agency into the relations between the parties. . . . [T]he procedure
in reality is that the parties negotiate, and in practically every such case one side or
the other abandons its contention as to arbitrability, or both agree to submit the issue
of arbitrability to arbitration. Where I have been named by the parties as an arbi-
trator of grievances, I have often been confronted by an employer's initial contention
that the asserted grievance is not arbitrable, but I have never been involved in a case
in which the employer refused to submit this issue to arbitration." (Emphasis added.)
20 International Ass'n of Machinists v. Cameron Iron Works, Inc., 257 F.2d 467,
474 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 880 (1958), as quoted by the court in the instant
case at 453.
